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A digital signature is a mathematical scheme for demonstrating the authenticity of a digital
message or document. For signing quantum messages, some arbitrated quantum signature schemes
have being proposed. However, in the existing literature, arbitrated quantum signature schemes
depend on entanglement. In this paper, we present two arbitrated quantum signature schemes
without utilizing entangled states in the signing phase and the verifying phase. The rst proposed
scheme can preserve the merits in the existing schemes. Then, we point out, in this scheme and
the prior schemes, there exists a problem that Bob can repudiate the integrality of the signatures.
To conquer this problem, we construct another arbitrated quantum signature scheme without using
quantum entangled states but using a public board. The new scheme has three advantages: it does
not utilize entangled states while it can preserve all merits in the existing schemes; the integrality
of the signature can avoid being disavowed by the receiver; and, it provides a higher eciency in
transmission and reduces the complexity of implementation. Furthermore, we present a technique
such that the quantum message can keep secret to the arbitrator in a arbitrated quantum signature
scheme.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud
I. Introduction
The most spectacular discovery in quantum computing
to date is that quantum computer can eciently perform
some tasks which are not feasible on a classical computer.
For example, Shor's quantum algorithm [1] can solve e-
ciently two enormously important problems: the problem
of nding the prime factors of an integer and the discrete
logarithm problem. This means most of the classical pub-
lic key cryptography are not secure if quantum computers
could be available someday. Fortunately, quantum cryp-
tography (quantum key distribution) depends on funda-
mental laws of physics to provide unconditional security
[2{9].
Digital signature and authentication is an essential
ingredient of classical cryptography and has been em-
ployed in various applications. Similar to the classical
public key cryptography, most classical digital signature
schemes based on the public key cryptography can be
broken by Shor's algorithm [1]. So, many researchers and
scholars turn to investigate quantum signature and au-
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thentication, which is supposed to provide an alternative
with unconditional security. Recently, some progress has
been made on quantum signature [10{22]. In particular,
an arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) scheme providing
many merits was proposed by Zeng and Keitel [12]. This
AQS scheme was further discussed in the corresponding
comments [23, 24]. In such a scheme, both known and
unknown quantum states could be signed, and the un-
conditional security is ensured by using the correlation
of Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) triplet states [25]
and quantum one-time pads [26].
Very recently, Li et al. [13] presented an arbitrated
quantum signature scheme using two-particle entangled
Bell states instead of GHZ states. The scheme using Bell
states can preserve the merits in the original scheme [12]
while providing a higher eciency in transmission and
reducing the complexity of implementation.
We observe that the main functions of quantum en-
tangled states (GHZ states and Bell states) in Refs.
[12, 13, 24] are to assist Alice to transfer quantum states
to Bob. However, Alice transfers quantum states to the
arbitrator by the ciphertext encrypted with the secret key
KA. Similarly, Alice can transfer quantum states to Bob
with a shared secret key. Considering that the prepa-
2ration, distribution and keeping of GHZ states and Bell
states are not easy to be implemented with the present-
day technologies, we construct a new arbitrated quan-
tum signature scheme without using quantum entangled
states. Furthermore, we discover that Bob can repudi-
ate the integrality of the signature in the proposed AQS
scheme and the AQS schems in Refs. [12, 13, 24]. There-
fore, we give a new AQS scheme that can avoid being
disavowed for the integrality of the signature by the re-
ceiver Bob.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
First, in Section II, we briey recall some notions and no-
tations concerning AQS. In Section III, we give an AQS
scheme similar to the schemes in Refs. [12, 13] but with-
out using entangled states. In Section IV, we discuss the
security of the scheme proposed in the previous section
and point out that, in the proposed scheme and the prior
schemes, there exists a problem that Bob can repudiate
the integrality of the signatures. In Section V, to con-
quer the problem mentioned in Section IV, we give a new
arbitrated quantum signature scheme without using en-
tangled states but using a public board. In Section VI,
we discuss the security of the scheme proposed in the pre-
vious section. The new scheme can conquer the problem
mentioned in Section IV and preserve all merits in the
foregoing schemes while providing a higher eciency in
transmission and reducing the complexity of implemen-
tation. Furthermore, we present a technique such that
the quantum message can keep secret to the arbitrator.
Finally, in Section VII, we make a conclusion.
In general, notation used in this paper will be explained
whenever new symbols appear.
II. Preliminaries
In this section, we briey recall some notions and no-
tations concerning AQS.
We use Pauli matrices x and z to denote the X and
Z gates, respectively. Let jP i be a quantum message as
jP i = jP1i 
 jP2i 
    
 jPni with jPii = ij0i+ ij1i.
For convenience, EK denotes the quantum one-time
pads encryption, proposed by Boykin and Roychowdhury
[26], according to some key K 2 f0; 1g satisfying jKj 
2n as follows:
EK(jP i) =
nO
i=1
K2i 1x 
K2i
z jPii; (1)
where Kj denotes the j-th bit of K. Similarly, RK de-
notes the unitary transformation
RK(jP i) =
nO
i=1
Kix 
Ki+1
z jPii: (2)
A secure arbitrated (quantum) signature scheme
should satisfy two requirements: one is that the signa-
ture should not be forged by the attacker (including the
malicious receiver) and the other is the impossibility of
disavowal by the signatory and the receiver [12, 13, 24].
III. An AQS scheme without using entangled
states
From the arbitrated quantum signature schemes in
Refs. [12, 24] and [13], we discover that the main func-
tions of quantum entangled states, GHZ states and Bell
states, are to assist Alice to transfer quantum states to
Bob. However, Alice transfers quantum states to the ar-
bitrator by the ciphertext encrypted with the secret key
KA. Similarly, Alice can transfer quantum states to Bob
with a shared secret key. Considering that the prepa-
ration, distribution and keeping of GHZ states and Bell
states are not easy to be implemented with the present-
day technologies, we construct a new arbitrated quan-
tum signature scheme without using entangled quantum
states in the signing phase and the verifying phase.
The presented scheme also involves three participants,
namely, signatory Alice, receiver Bob, and the arbitra-
tor, and includes three phases, the initializing phase, the
signing phase, and the verifying phase.
Suppose Alice need sign the quantum message jP i =
jP1i 
 jP2i 
    
 jPni with jPii = ij0i+ ij1i and has
at least three copies of jP i. For obtaining a low enough
error probability in the verifying phase, we can suppose
that n is large enough; otherwise, we use jP i
m instead
of jP i, where m is any a large enough integer.
A. Initializing phase
Step I1. Alice shares the secret keys KAa and KAB
with the arbitrator and Bob, respectively, by using the
quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols [2{4] that
were proved to be unconditionally secure [5{8]. Similarly,
Bob shares the secret key KBa with the arbitrator.
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Step S1. Alice computes jRAai = RKAa(jP i) and gen-
erates jSai = EKAa(jP i; jRAai).
Step S2. Alice computes jRABi = RKAB (jP i), gener-
ates her signature jSi = EKAB (jRABi; jSai), and sends it
to Bob. If they are far away from each other, they can use
quantum repeaters [27, 28] and fault-tolerant quantum
computation [29, 30] to ensure the signature jSi being
transferred perfectly.
C. Verifying phase
Step V1. Bob decrypts jSi with KAB and gets jRABi
and jSai.
Step V2. Bob generates jYBi = EKBa(jSai) and sends
it to the arbitrator.
Step V3. The arbitrator decrypts jYBi and obtains
jSai. Then, he gets jP i and jRAai from jSai with KAa.
Step V4. The arbitrator obtains jPai = R 1KAa(jRAai)
and compares it with jP i using the approach in Refs.
[13, 31]. If jPai = jP i, he sets the verication parameter
 = 1; otherwise  = 0.
Step V5. The arbitrator sends the encrypted results
jYaBi = EK0Ba(jP i; ) where the ith bit of K 0Ba is the
(4n+ i)-th bit of KBa.
Step V6. Bob decrypts jYaBi and obtains jP i and .
If  = 0, Bob considers that the signature has been ob-
viously forged and rejects; otherwise, he does the further
verication.
Step V7. Bob gets jPBi = R 1KAB (jRAai) and compares
it with jP i using the approach in Refs. [13, 31]. If jPBi =
jP i, Bob accepts the signature jSi; otherwise, he rejects
it.
IV. Security analysis and discussion of the AQS
scheme without using entangled states
A secure quantum signature scheme should satisfy
three requirements [12, 13, 24]: the signature should not
be forged by the attacker (including the malicious re-
ceiver); the signature should not be disavowed by the
signatory; and the signature should not be disavowed by
the receiver. We can show that the proposed scheme can
oer security as the scheme in Refs. [12, 13]. First, we
show the proposed AQS scheme without using entangled
states can satisfy the rst two requirements. Then, we
point out that the proposed AQS scheme and the exist-
ing schemes in Refs. [12, 13] can not satisfy the third
requirement.
A. Impossibility of forgery
If the malicious receiver Bob attempts to counterfeit
Alice's signature jSi = EKAB (jRABi; jSai) to his own
benet, he has to know Alice's secret key KAa to con-
struct jSai. However, this is impossible due to the un-
conditionally secure quantum key distribution. Besides,
the use of quantum one-time pad algorithm enhances the
security. Thus, Bob cannot get the correct jSai. There-
fore, the arbitrator will discover this forgery. If the at-
tacker Eve tries to forge Alice's signature jSi for her own
sake, she also should know the secret keys KAa and KAB .
However, the public information that he can obtain such
as jSi, jYBi, and jYaBi betrays nothing about the secret
keys KAa and KAB . Hence, the forgery for Eve is also
impossible.
B. Impossibility of disavowal by the signatory
If the signatory Alice and the receiver Bob disagree
with each other, the arbitrated trusted by both of them
should be required to make a judgment. Assume that
Alice disavows her signature. Then the arbitrator can
conrm that Alice has signed the message since the in-
formation of Alices secret key KAa is involved in jSai
of the signature jSi = EKAB (jRABi; jSai). Hence Alice
cannot deny having signed the message.
C. Bob can repudiate the integrality of the
signature
Suppose Bob repudiates the receipt of the signature.
Then the arbitrator also can conrm that Bob has re-
ceived the signature jSai since he needs the assistance
of the arbitrator to verify the signature. For instance,
the information of his key KBa is included in jYBi =
EKBa(jSai). So Bob cannot disavow that he has received
jSai.
However, Bob can repudiate the integrality of the sig-
nature jSi because he can reject the signature in Step
V7. Similarly, Bob can repudiate the integrality of the
signature in the AQS schemes in Refs. [12, 13, 24].
Are there some methods to improve the AQS schemes
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by Bob? We will give a new AQS scheme satisfying that
the receiver Bob can not disavow the integrality of the
signature.
V. An AQS scheme unable to be disavowed by Bob
We have known that the existing AQS schemes can
not avoid being disavowed for the integrality of the sig-
nature by Bob. In this section, we will present a new AQS
scheme without using quantum entangled states that can
avoid being disavowed for the integrality of the signature
by the receiver Bob.
Note that the QKD schemes [2{4] utilize generally
a public board or a classical channel that can not be
blocked. Lee et al. [15] proposed an AQS scheme with a
public board which can be adapted to sign classical mes-
sages. Also, we use a public board or a classical channel
that can not be blocked to improve the AQS schemes to
avoid being disavowed for the integrality of the signature
by Bob. To avoid being disavowed by Bob, we must set
the arbitrator's verifying after Bob's verifying.
The presented scheme also involves three participants,
namely, signatory Alice, receiver Bob, and the arbitra-
tor, and includes three phases, the initializing phase, the
signing phase, and the verifying phase.
A. Initializing phase
Step I10. Alice shares the secret keys KAa and KAB
with the arbitrator and Bob, respectively, by using
the quantum key distribution protocols [2{4] that were
proved to be unconditionally secure [5{8]. Similarly, Bob
shares the secret key KBa with the arbitrator.
B. Signing phase
Step S10. Alice randomly chooses a number r 2
f0; 1g2n and computes jP 0i = Er(jP i), and jRABi =
RKAB (jP 0i).
Step S20. Alice generates jSai = EKAa(jP 0i).
Step S30. Alice generates her signature jSi =
EKAB (jP 0i; jRABi; jSai) and sends it to Bob. If they are
far away from each other, they can use quantum repeaters
[27, 28] and fault-tolerant quantum computation [29, 30]
to ensure the signature jSi being transferred perfectly.
C. Verifying phase
Step V10. Bob decrypts jSi with KAB and gets jP 0i,
jRABi, and jSai.
Step V20. Bob obtains jP 0Bi = R 1KAB (jRABi) and
compares it with jP 0i using the approach in Refs. [13,
31]. If jP 0Bi = jP 0i, he generates and sends jYBi =
EKBa(jP 0i; jSai) to the arbitrator. Otherwise, he rejects
the signature.
Step V30. The arbitrator decrypts jYBi and obtains
jP 0i and jSai depending on the secret key KBa.
Step V40. The arbitrator obtains jP 0ai = E 1KAa(jSai)
and compares it with jP 0i. If jP 0ai 6= jP 0i, he tells Bob to
reject the signature by the public board and the scheme
aborts. Otherwise, he tells Alice and Bob the fact, jP 0ai =
jP 0i, by the public board.
Step V50. Alice publishes r by the public board.
Step V60. Bob gets back jP i from jP 0i by r.
VI. Security analysis of the AQS scheme using a
public board and comparison with other AQS
schemes
Impossibility of forgery in the AQS scheme using a
public board in Section V can be discussed as that of
the AQS scheme without entangled states in Section III.
Similarly, we can prove the impossibility of being dis-
avowed by the signatory. Here, we only discuss the im-
possibility of being disavowed by the receiver Bob in the
AQS scheme using a public board presented in Section
V.
A. Impossibility of disavowal by the receiver
It is clear that Bob must know the secret key KAB and
jP 0i = R 1KAB (jRABi) by Step V20. Furthermore, Bob
must have the secret key KBa and jP 0i = E 1KAB (jSai) by
Step V30 and Step V40. In addition, Bob can get back
jP i from jP 0i by Step V50 and Step V60. By the uncon-
dition security of the QKD and the quantum one-time
pad, other people could not know both KAB and KBa.
So, Bob can not disavow the receipt of the signature jSi
and the message jP i.
Statement 1. It is necessary that we only sent jP 0i in
the scheme. Bob can conrm that jSi is Alice's signature
and get jP i in Step V20 if we use jP i instead of jP 0i in
the scheme. So, Bob need not send jYBi to the arbitrator
5that means Bob has a chance to disavow the receipt of
the signature jSi and the message jP i.
Statement 2. If the message jP i needs to keep secret to
the arbitrator, we only need to modify Step V60 as \Alice
publishes r  K 0AB by the public board" where the ith
bit of K 0AB is (i+ 6n)-th bit of KAB .
Statement 3. Similarly, the new techniques that Bob
can not repudiate the integrality of the signature jSi and
the message jP i can keep secret to the arbitrator, can be
used to improve the prior arbitrated quantum signature
schemes [12, 13].
B. Comparing with other AQS schemes
The proposed arbitrated quantum signature scheme
with a public board without using entangled states can
not be disavowed by the receiver Bob while it maintains
all merits of the AQS scheme using two-particle entangled
Bell states in Ref. [13] and the AQS scheme using three-
particle entangled GHZ states in Ref. [12]. The scheme
can be adapted to both known and unknown quantum
states and still provides unconditional security by em-
ploying QKD technology [2{9] and quantum one-time
pads [26]. Furthermore, the AQS scheme with a pub-
lic board is more ecient in the following two aspects.
One is that the total number of the transmitted qubits
(bits), when n-qubit message is signed, is decreased as
described in Table I. By Ref. [13], we know that the
AQS scheme using Bell states is more ecient than that
using GHZ states. So, we only need to compare it with
the scheme using Bell states in Ref. [13]. Though Alice
TABLE I: Comparing of the transmitted qubits quantity
Transmission The scheme using The scheme using
Bell states [13] a public board
Alice!Bob 4n 3n
Bob!The arbitrator 4n 2n
The arbitrator!Bob 6n+ 1 0
The arbitrator publics 0 a constant
Alice publics 0 2n
needs to publish the 2n-bit randem string r, the total
number of the transmitted bits and qubits is decreased
signicantly.
The other is that the complexity of implementing the
scheme is reduced. Though the proposed scheme with
a public board needs some local operations, it need not
prepare and send Bell states and GHZ states because it
does not use entangled states.
From the discussions above, we conclude that the pro-
posed scheme with a public board achieves a higher e-
ciency in transmission and can be implemented easily.
VII. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed two arbitrated quan-
tum signature schemes. This two scheme can be adapted
to both known and unknown quantum states and still
provide unconditional security by employing QKD tech-
nology [2{9] and quantum one-time pads [26]. In the
rst one, we have not used quantum entangled states
and proved it preserves the merits in the prior schemes
[12, 13]. Furthermore, we have pointed out that there ex-
ists a problem that Bob can repudiate the integrality of
the signatures in the rst scheme proposed in the paper
and the prior schemes [12, 13]. To conquer this prob-
lem, we have constructed a new arbitrated quantum sig-
nature scheme without using quantum entangled states
but using a public board. The new scheme has three
advantages. First, it does not utilize entangled states
while it can preserve all merits in the existing schemes
[12, 13]. Secondly, the integrality of the signature can
avoid being disavowed by the receiver. In addition, it
provides a higher eciency in transmission and reduces
the complexity of implementation. We have presented a
technique such that the message jP i can keep secret to
the arbitrator. Furthermore, we have pointed out that
the new techniques can be used to improve on the prior
arbitrated quantum signature schemes [12, 13].
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